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Abstract
This paper generalizes the price discrimination framework of Mussa
and Rosen (1978) by considering salience-driven consumer preferences
in the sense of Bordalo et al. (2013b). Consumers with salience-driven
preferences give a higher weight to attributes that vary more. This re-
duces the monopolist’s propensity to treat different types of consumers
differently. The paper’s main result characterizes the conditions under
which the monopolist induces consumers to focus on price rather than
on quality.
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1 Introduction
Evidence from field and laboratory experiments suggests that preferences can
vary with the context (e.g. Kahneman et al., 1990; Simonson and Tversky,
1992). For example, introducing a dominated product might increase another
product’s demand, giving rise to the so-called decoy (Huber et al., 1982)
and compromise (Simonson, 1989) effects. Such context effects cannot be
explained by standard preferences since the presence of a product should
leave consumer choice between the other products unaffected.
One possible way of explaining context effects is the assumption that
consumers attach a higher weight to the attributes of a product that are
salient and the salience of the attributes depends on the context.
There is evidence for the effect of salience on the weights given to different
attributes. Chetty et al. (2009) find evidence that consumers underreact
to changes in taxes if taxes are not salient. Hossain and Morgan (2006),
studying the behavior of consumers on eBay, argue that shipping costs are
less salient than opening bids. They show that consumers indeed react less
to changes in shipping costs than to changes in opening bids. Recent results
in neuroeconomics are consistent with the idea that attention modulates
the weight given to different attributes (Hare et al., 2009; Fehr and Rangel,
2011). Marketing practitioners engage frequently in differentiating from their
competitors’ by drawing attention to certain attributes of their products
(Zhou, 2008).
Evidence shows that salience depends on how much attributes vary within
the choice set. Schkade and Kahneman (1998) consider the choice between
living in California and the Midwest and show that individuals place a higher
weight on attributes that differ strongly across these two options.
Imagine a supermarket offers two versions of whiskey. They are both
single malt whiskeys but differ in their age, with higher age being associ-
ated with higher quality. The lower quality version is 12 years old while
the higher quality whiskey was in the barrel for 18 years. They are offered
for $30 and $40, respectively. A consumer values the younger version at
36 and the older version at 54. If the consumer has standard quasi-linear
preferences, he prefers the older whiskey since it yields a higher utility. If a
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consumer has salience-driven preferences, the high quality difference attracts
the consumer’s attention. The older version is 50% more valuable than the
younger version but it is only 30% more expensive. Since quality gets more
attention, i.e. since quality is salient, the consumer gives a higher weight to
this attribute which makes the older whiskey even more attractive. A couple
of weeks later, the same consumer enters the supermarket and finds the two
whiskeys are on sale. They are now offered at $15 and $25, respectively. The
price difference and the quality difference are still the same. A consumer
with standard preferences would again opt for the older whiskey. However,
the difference in price now stings out. While the older version is still 50%
more valuable, it is now 66.7% more expensive than the younger version.
Price is salient to a consumer with salience-driven preferences and thus gets
a higher weight. The consumer is not willing to pay the extra $10 anymore
and buys the younger whiskey. In this whiskey example, the attention and
weight a consumer gives to an attribute depends on whether an offer seems
to be a good deal, i.e. has a good quality-price ratio.
Such behavior can be explained by the salience-driven preferences of Bor-
dalo et al. (2013b). In an influential paper, they have proposed a model
of salient thinking which incorporates these observations. In their model,
consumers give a higher weight to more salient attributes of a product. The
salience of an attribute depends on the difference of the attribute’s value
to the average value of the attribute within the choice set. This implies a
context effect because each attribute’s average value depends on all products
that are offered. If products are defined by only two attributes, quality and
price, the model provides the intuitive result that consumers’ preferences are
biased towards the product with the higher quality-price ratio.
Salient thinking becomes relevant as soon as there is more than one prod-
uct in the market. Consequently, Bordalo et al. (2016) study the implications
of salience-driven consumer preferences for competing firms. However, there
is another situation in which several products may coexist. In a market with
heterogeneous preferences, a monopolist may offer multiple products in order
to separate different types of consumers. It remains an open question how
a multi-product monopolist would react to salient thinking if consumers are
2
heterogeneous in their valuation of quality.
Continuing with the example, consider a second type of consumer who
has a higher valuation of whiskey. This type values the 12 years old whiskey
at 40 and the 18 years old whiskey at 60. Being aware of the differences in
valuations, the supermarket can adopt different strategies. He can try to pool
both types of consumers either on the young or on the old version of whiskey.
Alternatively, the supermarket can choose prices and qualities such that the
high valuation type self-selects into buying the old whiskey, while the low
type buys the young version. Finally, the supermarket can exclude the low
type and only sell one version of the whiskey at a high price. When choosing
its strategy, the supermarket has to take into account that the design of its
products also influences whether its customers focus on the price or on the
age of the whiskeys.
This paper is interested in a monopolist’s optimal design of a product
portfolio, taking into account its effect on the salience of attributes. It looks
at the situation when two versions of the product are possible, e.g. 12 years
old and 18 years old whiskey. If the monopolist decides only to sell one
version of the product, he could additionally offer a “decoy”, i.e. a second
version of the product that manipulates consumer’s focus without actually
being sold. In a next step, I consider the possibility to offer more variants of
the product.
In order to investigate the optimal strategy of a monopolist, I introduce
the salience-driven consumer preferences of Bordalo et al. (2013b) into the
standard monopolist price discrimination model of Mussa and Rosen (1978).
A monopolist offers a product portfolio with products that are characterized
by their qualities and prices. There are two types of consumers with different
valuations of quality. As in Mussa and Rosen (1978), a consumer’s valua-
tion of quality is proportional to his type. Consumers have salience-driven
preferences, i.e. they give a higher weight to the attribute which is salient.
Following Bordalo et al. (2013b), when consumers compare two products,
they give a higher weight to quality if and only if the high-quality product
has a higher quality-price ratio. Giving a higher weight to quality increases a
consumer’s willingness to pay since they overestimate the quality. Focussing
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on price decreases the willingness to pay since it lets consumers overestimate
the costs.
The first result of this paper is that in comparison with the benchmark
case of consumers with standard preferences, we observe less separation if
consumers have salience-driven preferences. Separation of consumers with
salience-driven preferences is less profitable than if consumers had standard
preferences. At the same time, profits from pooling and excluding low types
increase. Assuming that the monopolist faces consumers with standard pref-
erences thus overestimates his propensity to employ price discrimination.
Furthermore, when separating consumers with salience-driven preferences,
there is a “distortion at the top” in the sense that in case of separation, the
monopolist offers a lower quality to the high type than he would if this type
was alone in the market.
In a market with two products, the same attribute is salient for both prod-
ucts (Bordalo et al., 2013b). Generally, allowing for heterogeneous consumers
entails the possibility that different types focus on different attributes. How-
ever, in the simple case of linear preferences as in Mussa and Rosen (1978),
all consumers focus on the same attribute. Hence, it becomes a sensible
question to ask under what conditions we will observe a price-salient or a
quality-salient market.
Which attribute is salient relates directly to the optimal strategy of the
monopolist. If there is separation in the market, consumers always focus on
price. Separation is optimal for an intermediate range of heterogeneity and
share of high types. If there is pooling or exclusion of low types in the market,
consumers always focus on quality. This is optimal when heterogeneity is low
and the share of high types is large or when heterogeneity is high and the
share of high types is low.
For our whiskey example, this implies that a supermarket should opti-
mally adapt the strategy to changes in valuations and share of high types.
Assume that during the week, there are few high types. It would thus be
optimal to pool the types on the older whiskey and offer the younger version
with only a small reduction in price. The younger whiskey serves to attract
consumers’ attention towards quality. At the weekend, more consumers have
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a high valuation of alcoholic drinks, which makes it more profitable to sepa-
rate. In order to separate the high and the low type, the supermarket makes
the older whiskey relatively more expensive and the customers focus on the
high price difference. Suppose that after a couple of weeks, the share of high
value consumers has increased. This new development makes it more prof-
itable for the supermarket to exclude the few low types and sell the older
whiskey only to the high types. It decreases the difference in price, which
makes consumers focus on quality.
If the monopolist can offer more products, he might be able to separate
consumers while making quality salient. It turns out that it is not always
possible to find three products which make the optimally separating products
quality salient. However, if the monopolist is not restricted in the number
of products, he can always induce quality salience in the market by offering
multiple decoys. Hence, the model predicts separation with quality salience
if development costs of such decoys are low and separation with price salience
if development costs are high. As long as development costs are non-zero,
the monopolist is less likely to separate than in the benchmark case with
standard preferences.
Hence, this paper provides an explanation for the observation that there
is little price discrimination even in settings in which we expect consumers
to be heterogeneous as e.g. in cinemas or theaters (Huntington, 1993; Leslie,
2004). Pooling is more likely to be observed if there are many consumers
with low valuation in the market and heterogeneity is not too high. This is
in line with the observation that motels often only offer one category while
hotels or airlines offer several categories in order to price discriminate (Hahn
et al., 2018).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature on standard price discrimination and price discrimination when
consumers have non-standard preferences. Section 3 presents the model,
including a review of the salience model of Bordalo et al. (2013b). In Section
4, the benchmark with consumers with standard preferences is considered.
Section 5 derives the optimal strategy of a monopolist facing consumers with
salience-driven preferences and Section 6 presents some robustness results.
5
Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
2.1 Price discrimination with standard preferences
Price discrimination can be defined as the strategy to offer two or more similar
goods at prices that are in different ratios to marginal costs (e.g. books in
hardcover and in paperback) (Varian 1989, p.598). Such price discrimination
can be observed in situations of imperfect information, i.e. when consumers
have different types and a firm cannot directly observe these types. However,
the distribution of these types is common knowledge. In order to maximize
profits, a monopolist can offer several products and choose the design in
such a way that different types of consumers choose different versions of the
product. Price discrimination can occur for example in terms of quality,
quantity or intertemporally.
One of the first papers studying this problem was Mussa and Rosen
(1978). They consider a consumer’s utility function u(q, p; θ) = θq − p,
where q is the quality and p the price of a product. Consumers differ in
their valuation of quality θ. Mussa and Rosen (1978) solve the monopolist’s
problem and compare the offered products under monopoly with the offered
products under competition. When there are only two types of consumers
and the monopolist wants to separate, he offers the efficient quality to the
type with the higher valuation, i.e. the same quality as under competition or
perfect information. It is a very general result, that the consumer type with
the highest valuation of quality faces a marginal price equal to marginal costs
(Varian 1989, p.614). Such “no distortion at the top” is usually also true if
interpreted as the same quality being offered to the highest type as if this
type was alone in the market. However, this result does not hold if consumers
exhibit salient thinking and the monopolist is restricted to two products. If
separation is optimal, price is salient and the quality which is offered to the
high type is lower than in the absence of the low type. If there was only the
high type, the monopolist could offer products which make quality salient
and would offer a higher quality.
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In the case of two consumer types, the monopolist separates consumers
with standard preferences with a high-quality product which has a lower
quality-price ratio than the low-quality product. Considering salience-driven
preferences, the separation of types also requires offering the higher quality
product at a lower quality-price ratio. However, if the monopolist wants
to pool both types on the high-quality product or exclude low types, it is
optimal for him to offer the higher quality product at a higher quality-price
ratio. This allows the monopolist to make consumers focus on quality.
2.2 Price discrimination with non-standard preferences
In recent years, a considerable literature on monopolistic price discrimination
with consumers with non-standard preferences has developed. Typically,
consumers exhibit some behavioral bias and the monopolist can try to exploit
and benefit from this bias. In the case of context-dependent preferences,
the monopolist has to take into account his influence on the context. The
monopolist then often benefits from offering a “decoy”, i.e. an additional
product that is not meant to be sold but affects the attention of consumers.
Closest to this paper are papers which consider the monopolist’s problem
when the relative weights which consumers give to attributes depend on the
attributes of the offered products. Consumers weight attributes according to
a specific rule, i.e. there is no strategic attention allocation. Dahremöller and
Fels (2015) assume that consumers give higher weights to attributes which
they value strongly and which vary strongly in the choice set. Furthermore,
the cost of considering an additional attribute increases in the number of
considered attributes. They show how a monopolist benefits from offering
different products even if consumers are homogeneous because it manipu-
lates the expectations of consumers. Considering heterogeneous consumers,
they restrict attention to the case in which the monopolist can only offer
two products with attributes quality and price. If the optimal products sep-
arate the types, the type with high valuation of quality will focus on quality
while the type with low valuation focuses on price. The monopolist will thus
over-provide quality for the high type and under-provide quality for the low
type. This is different to the results of this paper, which say that when the
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monopolist can only offer two products, separation implies that both types
of consumers focus on price. The monopolist will therefore under-provide
quality for both types compared to the quality he would offer to consumers
with standard preferences. Given the definition of salience of Bordalo et al.
(2013b) and linear preferences, it is impossible for the monopolist to make
consumer types focus on different attributes. In contrast to that, Dahremöller
and Fels (2015) assume that higher weight is given to attributes which have
a high difference between highest and lowest type-specific value. This makes
it possible that different types focus on different attributes.
Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) develop a model with focus-weighted utility.
Consumers focus and thus give more weight to attributes which have a greater
range of consumption utility. The range is defined by the difference of the
maximal and the minimal utility which an attribute in the choice set yields.
Compared to Dahremöller and Fels (2015), the attention a consumer allo-
cates to an attribute is independent of other attributes’ characteristics. Wis-
son (2015) applies that model of focusing to the monopolist’s problem. He
finds that if focusing is strong enough, it widens the valuation gap between
consumers. In equilibrium, the high type focuses on quality whereas the low
type focuses on price. Incentive compatibility constraints do not bind in
that case. The monopolist can offer the efficient product to high types and
extract almost all surplus, while still serving the low types. In contrast to
the case with standard preferences, separation now always dominates only
serving high types and pooling is optimal in some situations. An additional
insight of Wisson (2015) is that the monopolist does not benefit from offering
a decoy in most cases. The difficulty not to make the decoy more desirable
than the other products restricts the increase in profits. Again the predic-
tions differ from my result that the monopolist separates with products which
make price salient. Making quality salient for one type and price salient for
the other type makes it easier to separate and increases profits. However,
one of my results says that the monopolist would optimally want both types
of consumers to focus on quality since this increases the willingness to pay.
He would thus always try to offer decoys which implement this pattern of
attention.
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In the previous models by Dahremöller and Fels (2015), Kőszegi and
Szeidl (2013) and Wisson (2015), the salience of attributes depends on the
products in the choice set. The monopolist can influence salience by designing
these products. In contrast, Zhou (2008) assumes that salience can directly
be influenced by the monopolist. The monopolist can use advertising to draw
attention towards some of the product’s attributes.
This paper is related to a broader literature on monopolistic pricing in
the presence of consumers with non-standard preferences. Carbajal and Ely
(2012), Heidhues and Kőszegi (2004), Herweg and Mierendorff (2013), Hahn
et al. (2018) and Karle and Möller (2017) consider a monopolist facing loss
averse consumers. Hahn et al. (2018) find that loss aversion can explain why
we observe pooling more often than expected. Similar to our model, price
discrimination comes at a cost. Courty and Nasiry (2016) show how loss
aversion can explain uniform/compressed pricing of different quality levels.
Allowing the monopolist to offer decoys, our model predicts that he has an
incentive to reduce price variance in order to make quality salient. Rotem-
berg (2011) finds the optimal products for fair consumers and DellaVigna
and Malmendier (2004) let consumers discount hyperbolically. Esteban et
al. (2007)’s consumers have self-control preferences in the sense of Gul and
Pesendorfer (2001). Grubb (2009) lets his monopolist sell to overconfident
consumers.
Salient thinking in the sense of Bordalo et al. (2013b) has been considered
in other settings as e.g. competitive markets (Bordalo et al. 2016, Herweg et
al. 2017) and asset markets (Bordalo et al., 2013a) or combined with limited
attention (Inderst and Obradovits, 2015) and attribute shrouding (Inderst
and Obradovits, 2016). Herweg et al. 2017 look at heterogeneous consumers
in a setting with a brand manufacturer and a competitive fringe and show
that the manufacturer benefits from introducing a decoy.
Alternative models of salience are developed e.g. by Kőszegi and Szeidl
(2013), Loomes and Sugden (1982) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006).
9
2.3 Empirical evidence
The salience-driven preferences of Bordalo et al. (2013b) provide an expla-
nation to several observations which are hard to explain by standard prefer-
ences. Some evidence on context effects and salience-driven preferences has
been mentioned in the introduction. Additional evidence on context effects
is provided for example by Thaler (1985). He finds that the willingness to
pay for a bottle of beer depends on the shop in which the consumer buys it.
Hastings and Shapiro (2013) report that when the price of gasoline increased,
surprisingly many consumers switched to cheaper low-quality gasoline. Evi-
dence that individuals focus on salient characteristics is shown e.g. by Barber
and Odean (2008). They find that investors simplify a decision by choosing
the salient option. A lot of research in political science has been done on the
choice of candidates on a ballot. Ho and Imai (2008) find that being the first,
and thus salient, candidate on the list improves the chances to be chosen.
Chetty et al. (2009) show that consumers react more strongly to tax changes
if taxes are salient. Finally, Dertwinkel-Kalt et al. (2017) find strong support
for the implications of salience-driven preferences in a laboratory experiment.
It is difficult to find evidence on products which are offered only in or-
der to manipulate the consumer choices since firms are usually reluctant to
reveal their strategies. However, some evidence suggests that they actually
do offer such decoys. Ariely (2008) runs an experiment in which he tests the
offer of The Economist. He finds that the introduction of a third, dominated
option increases the share of consumers choosing the expensive offer. Vikan-
der (2010) considers Audi advertising a premium car in halftime of super
bowl as an example of a firm offering a high-quality product at a high price
to consumers who are not supposed to buy it. Eliaz and Spiegler (2011)
explain that Apple concentrates the advertisement for its MacBook Air on
the extreme feature of being very thin. This attracts consumers into the
store where they learn that the MacBook Air has, for example, no DVD
drive. Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) interpret the healthy food at McDonald’s as
a strategy to attract consumers with a healthy image, without the intention
to sell it. These decoy products have in common that they are rather bad
deals in the sense of a low quality-price ratio. While most of them are high-
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quality products which are offered at a high price, also low-quality products
can serve as decoys. Heath and Chatterjee (1995) report a meta-analysis
of evidence for the effect of low-quality decoys. Jahedi (2011) conducts lab
experiments to show how bargains influence consumers’ decisions. He finds
evidence that participants rather buy a product if it is presented next to
a less attractive offer. Facing consumers with salience-driven preferences, I
find that the monopolist offers low-quality decoys whenever he wants to pool
or to exclude the low types. Thereby, he can attract consumer attention
towards quality.
3 Model
Following the seminal model by Mussa and Rosen (1978), consider a monop-
olist facing consumers with different valuations of quality.
There is a continuum of consumers. A share α ∈ (0, 1) is of type H and
a share (1−α) is of type L. Consumer i’s experience utility from consuming
a product with quality q and price p is given by quasi-linear preferences for
i = L,H:
ui(q, p) = θiq − p, (1)
where θi denotes the valuation of quality. The two types of consumers value
quality differently with θH = 1 and θL = θ < 1. With such preferences,
the difference in types can be interpreted as difference in income and higher
income increases the demand.1
The monopolist offers products with quality q and price p. The produc-
tion technology exhibits constant returns to scale and production costs are
increasing in quality at an increasing rate. For simplicity, assume that costs
take the form c(q) = 1
2
q2.2 The monopolist’s problem is to offer a product
portfolio that maximizes his profit. Since the monopolist cannot observe the
1I will show in Section 6.3 that the results hold for any quasi-linear utility function
u(q, θi) − p, with u(q, θi) increasing and concave in q, increasing in θi and satisfying the
single-crossing property (a type with higher valuation has a higher marginal utility of
quality).
2In Section 6.4, I generalize the main results to any increasing, strictly convex cost
function, i.e. any c(q) with c′(q) > 0, c′′(q) > 0 and c(0) = 0.
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type of the consumer, he offers the same product portfolio to all consumers.
Consumers observe all products that are offered. Since in Mussa and Rosen
(1978) it is optimal for the monopolist to offer at most two products, I start
with the assumption that the monopolist is restricted to two products. This
restriction can be justified by high and increasing development costs. While
the development costs of a second product can be covered by the additional
profit, the development costs of a third product are for now assumed to be
too high. Alternatively, one can think of products, where only two versions
are possible. For example, there is typically only a first and a second class
in the train. Books are offered with paperback or with hardcover. Food
products have a standard and an organic version. In Section 6, I consider
the monopolist’s problem when he could offer three or more products.
Following Bordalo et al. (2013b), consumers have salience-driven prefer-
ences. If one attribute is more salient than the other, consumers give more
weight to that attribute. Their decision utility ud(q, p) therefore differs from
their experience utility. If quality is salient, price gets lower weight, charac-
terized by the salience parameter δ ∈ (0, 1]. If price is salient, quality gets
lower weight δ. A consumer of type i = H,L thus considers the following
decision utility3:
udi (q, p) =

θiq − δp if quality is salient
δθiq − p if price is salient
θiq − p if price and quality are equally salient.
(2)
Which attribute gets more attention is not chosen by the consumer but is
endogenously determined by the monopolist’s choice of offered products. The
salience of an attribute a depends on its distance to this attribute’s value of a
reference product. The reference product is defined by the average values of
each attribute ā = 1
N
∑
j aj, where N is the number of products (j = 1, .., N)
in the consideration set. I assume that the consideration set consists of
the products offered by the monopolist. Nevertheless, the consumer can
always decide not to buy.4 The salience of an attribute a is then given by the
symmetric and continuous salience function σ(a, ā). There are two important
3For simplicity, I use the same utility function as Bordalo et al. (2016).
4This assumption differs from the assumption of Bordalo et al. (2013b). They consider
the outside option to be part of the consideration set.
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assumptions on this salience function: ordering and homogeneity of degree
zero. Ordering means that a higher distance from an attribute to its average
leads to a higher value of the salience function:
Assumption 1 (Ordering). Let µ = sgn(aj− ā). Then for any ε, ε′ ≥ 0 with
ε+ ε′ > 0, we have
σ(aj + µε, ā− µε′) > σ(aj, ā). (3)
Intuitively, higher differences attract the attention more strongly. The
second assumption captures the idea that the salience of an attribute is in-
dependent of its unit of measurement:
Assumption 2 (Homogeneity of degree zero).
σ(αaj, αā) = σ(aj, ā) for all α > 0. (4)
Assuming that the salience function is homogeneous of degree zero and
satisfies ordering implies diminishing sensitivity for positive attribute levels.
The same distance to the average leads to a lower salience at higher levels of
a and ā:
Diminishing sensitivity : For any aj, ā ≥ 0 and all ε > 0, we have
σ(aj + ε, ā+ ε) > σ(aj, ā). (5)
Diminishing sensitivity incorporates Weber’s law into the salience func-
tion. Weber’s law says that the perceived change in stimuli gets smaller at
higher initial levels of the stimuli.
Considering only two attributes, quality and price, quality is salient for a
product j and a consumer i if and only if the salience function is higher for
quality than for price:
σ(θiqj, θiq̄) > σ(pj, p̄). (6)
Price is salient if and only if σ(θiqj, θiq̄) < σ(pj, p̄) and price and quality
are equally salient if and only if σ(θiqj, θiq̄) = σ(pj, p̄). In contrast to Bordalo
et al. (2013b), consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of quality. It
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is assumed that the salience of quality is defined by the subjective utility
from quality θiq and not by objective quality q. However, it follows directly
from the assumption of homogeneity of degree zero and the linearity of pref-
erences that the value of the salience function is independent of the type of
a consumer:
σ(θiaj, θiā) = σ(aj, ā) for all θi > 0. (7)
Whether a product’s price or a product’s quality is salient does therefore
not depend on the type of the consumer. The same attribute is salient for all
types and which attribute is salient thus constitutes a feature of the market
under consideration.5
We can use Proposition 1 from Bordalo et al. (2013b) in order to deter-
mine which attribute is salient. Homogeneity of degree zero of the salience
function implies that the salience of attributes is determined by the quality-
price ratio of a product. Given a product (qj, pj) is neither dominated nor
dominates the reference product (q̄, p̄), i.e. (qj − q̄)(pj − p̄) > 0, then the
advantage of that product (higher quality or lower price) is salient if and
only if
qj
pj
>
q̄
p̄
. (8)
In the case of two products (qH , pH) and (qL, pL) with qH > qL and
pH > pL, the Proposition implies that quality is salient for both products if
and only if
qH
pH
>
qL
pL
, (9)
whereas price is salient when the inequality is reversed. Quality is salient if
and only if the quality-price ratio of the high-quality product is higher than
the quality-price ratio of the low-quality product.
Without taking into account salient thinking, the monopolist will separate
by offering the high-quality product at a higher price per quality. Price will
5This result relies on preferences being linear in the taste parameter θ. Hence, it also
holds for experience utility given by θiu(q)−p. If experience utility is equal to u(q, θi)−p,
different types might focus on different attributes.
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then be salient, which reduces the willingness to pay of the consumers and
might thus not be in the best interest of the monopolist. In the next section, I
will derive this benchmark result when consumers have standard preferences.
4 Benchmark with standard preferences
The monopolist can offer two different products and induce types to separate
or he can pool by selling the same product to both types. As a third option, he
can exclude the low type from the market by offering a product(s) that only
the high type is willing to buy. In this section, I will review the results from
the model of Mussa and Rosen (1978) with two types of consumers and use
it as a benchmark. In the following section, the optimal product portfolio for
consumers with salience-driven preferences is determined in order to compare
it with the benchmark.
If the monopolist wants to separate the two types, he has to take into
account the participation constraints (PC) and the incentive compatibility
constraints (IC). The monopolist’s problem is
max
pH ,pL,qH ,qL
α(pH −
1
2
q2H) + (1− α)(pL −
1
2
q2L)
s.t. θqL − pL ≥ 0 PCL
qH − pH ≥ 0 PCH
θqL − pL ≥ θqH − pH ICL
qH − pH ≥ qL − pL. ICH
It is well known that the participation constraint of the low type and the
incentive compatibility constraint of the high type will be binding. The other
two constraints are then redundant. The optimal products satisfy the first
order conditions: qBH = 1 and q
B
L = θ − α1−α(1 − θ). Profits from separation
are πBS =
1
2
1
1−α(θ
2 + α − 2αθ), where I use the superscript B to denote the
benchmark.
Such separation is possible only for θ ≥ α since the quality offered to
low types must be non-negative. If the valuation of the low type is lower,
the monopolist benefits from excluding the low type from the market and
designing a product for high types only. The participation constraint of
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the high type is then binding. The following first order condition gives us
the optimal product: qBE = 1. The monopolist’s profits from exclusion are
πBE =
1
2
α.
If the monopolist decides to sell the same product to both types of con-
sumers, the participation constraint of the low type is binding. The optimal
pooling product is characterized by the first order condition: qBP = θ. The
monopolist’s profits amount to πBP =
1
2
θ2.
Comparing the profits from the different strategies identifies the optimal
strategy of the monopolist. I assume that the monopolist always separates
when he is indifferent. The monopolist prefers separation to exclusion if and
only if
πBS ≥ πBE ⇔ (θ − α)2 ≥ 0. (10)
The monopolist prefers separation to pooling if and only if
πBS ≥ πBP ⇔ (1− θ)2 ≥ 0. (11)
Both conditions are always fulfilled, so whenever separation is possible
it is optimal for the monopolist. Finally, exclusion is preferred to pooling if
and only if
πBE ≥ πBP ⇔ θ ≤ α1/2. (12)
In case of quadratic costs and consumers with standard preferences, the
monopolist’s optimal strategy is to separate if θ ≥ α, and to exclude low types
otherwise. The monopolist’s optimal strategy is thus to always differentiate
the consumers’ types. Proposition 1 summarizes these results:
Proposition 1. Given standard preferences, the optimal strategy of the mo-
nopolist can be characterized as follows:
1. Separation: If θ ≥ α, the monopolist separates with qBH = 1 and
pBH =
1
1−α [1+θ
2−(1+α)θ], qBL = θ− α1−α(1−θ) and p
B
L = θ
2− α
1−αθ(1−θ).
2. Exclusion: If θ < α, the monopolist only serves high types with qBE = 1
and pBE = 1.
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If the valuation of the low types is high enough, it is optimal for the
monopolist to sell to both types and design the products such that high and
low types separate. The high type is offered the efficient quality while the low
type’s quality is distorted downwards to make sure the high type does not
deviate to the low-quality product. If the valuation of quality of the low type
is low, the monopolist does better by excluding low types and extracting the
whole rent from high types. The monopolist still offers the efficient quality to
high types, but can now ask for a higher price for the high-quality product.
5 Salience-driven consumer preferences
When consumers exhibit salience-driven preferences, the monopolist has to
take into account how the design of his product portfolio affects the salience
of the products’ attributes. Participation and incentive compatibility con-
straints of the consumers depend on whether quality or price (or neither) is
salient. The monopolist can again choose between separation, exclusion and
pooling the two types of consumers. Considering these strategies separately,
it turns out that there are direct relationships between the strategies and
the salience of attributes. In the following subsections, these relationships
between strategies and salience, the profits and the optimal products are
derived.
5.1 Separation with quality salience
If consumers have salience-driven preferences, it seems intuitive that letting
the two types focus on different attributes would make separation easier.
However, we already found that it is impossible to design two products which
make one type of consumer focus on quality and the other type focus on price.
The monopolist can only “choose”, by designing the products accordingly,
whether consumers focus on quality or on price (or on neither). The con-
sumers’ willingness to pay is higher if quality is salient because it makes
them discount, in relative terms, the payment they have to make. It there-
fore seems promising for the monopolist to make quality salient. In order to
make quality salient, he has to design his products such that the high-quality
17
version has a higher quality-price ratio:
qH
pH
>
qL
pL
. (13)
However, independent of the weight a consumer attaches to quality and price,
the following holds: any two products which satisfy condition (13) cannot
satisfy simultaneously the participation constraint and the incentive com-
patibility constraint of the low type. Making quality salient requires offering
the higher quality at a lower price per quality. Since preferences are linear,
a product with higher quality offered at a lower price per quality would be
strictly preferred by the low type. Figure 1 shows that given a low-quality
product (qL, pL) which the low type would accept, any higher quality product
which makes quality salient is strictly preferred by the low type.
(0, 0) qH
pH
qL
pL
ICL
ICH
pL
qL
price salient
price salient
quality salient
quality salient
dominated
dominating
separating
Figure 1: Separating consumers with salience-driven preferences. If the partici-
pation constraint of the low type is satisfied, the incentive compatibility constraint of the
low type is steeper than the constant ratio line pL/qL. Then, any product which would
separate the two types needs to have a higher price-quality ratio than product L and hence
would make price salient.
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Lemma 1. Suppose there is a product (qL, pL) which satisfies the participa-
tion constraint of a consumer with utility u(q, p) = θq− δp, δ ∈ (0, 1]. Then,
any product (qH , pH) with higher quality qH ≥ qL and higher price pH ≥ pL
which makes quality salient, i.e. qH
pH
> qL
pL
, is strictly preferred to (qL, pL).
Lemma 1 implies that it is impossible for the monopolist to separate
consumers who focus on quality with two products which indeed make quality
salient. The same is true if consumers are focusing on price or on neither
of the attributes. Hence, the monopolist cannot separate consumers with
two products which make quality salient. The proof can be found in the
Appendix.
5.2 Separation with price salience
The analysis in the previous section has shown that the monopolist is not
able to separate consumers with products which make quality salient. Fur-
thermore, I show in the Appendix that the monopolist would never separate
with products which induce neutral salience. It remains to check whether
the monopolist can and wants to separate consumers while making price
salient. Price is salient if and only if the quality-price ratio of the low-quality
product is higher than the quality-price ratio of the high-quality product.
Figure 1 shows that any higher quality product which satisfies the conditions
for separation lies in the area of price salience, given the incentive compat-
ibility constraint of the low type is not binding. Therefore, any separating
products will induce price salience. In order to find the optimal products
for the monopolist, we have to solve the profit maximization problem of the
monopolist given price salience. The monopolist faces the participation and
incentive compatibility constraints of consumers who give a higher weight to
prices:
δθqL − pL ≥ 0 PCLP
δqH − pH ≥ 0 PCHP
δθqL − pL ≥ δθqH − pH ICLP
δqH − pH ≥ δqL − pL. ICHP
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Redefining types as θ′L = δθ and θ
′
H = δ, it is clear that the problem can
be solved in the standard way. In the optimum, the participation constraint
of the low type and the incentive compatibility constraint of the high type
are binding: pL = δθqL and pH = δ(qH − qL) + δθqL. The participation
constraint of the high type and the incentive compatibility constraint of the
low type are then redundant. The monopolist maximizes his profits:
max
qH ,qL
α[δ(qH − qL) + δθqL −
1
2
q2H ] + (1− α)[δθqL −
1
2
q2L]. (14)
The first order conditions define the optimal qualities. The optimal prices
are then determined by the binding participation constraint of the low type
and the binding incentive compatibility constraint of the high type:
qH = δ, (15)
qL = δθ −
α
1− α
δ(1− θ), (16)
pH = δ
2 1
1− α
[1 + θ2 − (1 + α)θ], (17)
pL = δ
2θ2 − α
1− α
δ2θ(1− θ). (18)
The optimal separating products given price salience indeed satisfy the
price salience condition:
qH
pH
<
qL
pL
⇔ 0 < (1− θ)
2
δθ[1− θ + θ(θ − α)]
. (19)
The condition θ ≥ α is again necessary for separation to exist and be
possibly optimal because first, the monopolist cannot offer products with
negative quality and second he would make zero profit on low types if θ < α
and then prefers to exclude them (see Section 5.3).
Similar to the benchmark case with standard preferences, there is no
distortion at the top given price salience. The low quality is distorted down-
wards relative to the efficient price-salient quality in order to discourage the
high types from deviating. When interpreting the “no distortion at the top”
result as quality being the same as when the consumer type was alone in the
market, the results change compared to the benchmark case. I show in Sec-
tion 5.3 that if the high type was alone in the market, the monopolist would
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be able to make quality salient and would offer a higher quality in order to
benefit from the high willingness to pay. The presence of the low type makes
price salience necessary and reduces the quality offered to the high type.
Compared to the benchmark case, the willingness to pay of consumers
who focus on price is lower. The quality offered to consumers with salience-
driven preferences is therefore lower, discounted by the salience parameter δ.
The monopolist’s profit from separating consumers is then:
πS = δ
2 1
2
1
1− α
(θ2 + α− 2αθ). (20)
If salience becomes more important, i.e. if δ decreases, profits decrease.
Taking into account the salience of the consumers, it turns out that a
monopolist cannot separate with quality salience and separating with neutral
salience is never optimal. The monopolist only separates with products that
make price salient.
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Proposition 2. If it is optimal for a monopolist to separate consumers, he
separates by use of a product portfolio which makes price salient.
Proposition 2 shows that if consumers have salience-driven preferences,
separation comes at a cost. In order to separate, the monopolist uses a
product portfolio which makes price salient and decreases the willingness
to pay of the consumers. This has a negative effect on his profits from
separation.
5.3 Exclusion
If the monopolist excludes the low types, he offers a product (qE, pE) which
satisfies the participation constraint of the high types but not of the low
types. The willingness to pay for the product of the high type is highest when
its quality is salient. Therefore, the monopolist could benefit from offering a
second product (qD, pD) which makes quality salient. This second product is
offered as a decoy, in the sense that it draws consumers’ attention towards
quality but is not meant to be sold. Hence, the decoy must be designed such
that quality becomes salient and both types do not choose to buy it. Given
the exclusion product (qE, pE) satisfies the participation constraint of the
high type, Lemma 1 (with θ = 1) implies that it is impossible to use a higher
quality product as a decoy. Any higher quality product which makes quality
salient would be preferred by the high type. In contrast to that, Lemma
2 below shows that any lower quality product with qD < qE and pD < pE
which makes quality salient would not be preferred by the high type.
Lemma 2. Suppose there is a product (qE, pE) which satisfies the participa-
tion constraint of a consumer with utility u(q, p) = q − δp, δ ∈ (0, 1]. Then,
any product (qD, pD) with lower quality qD ≤ qE and lower price pD ≤ pE
which makes quality salient, i.e. qD
pD
< qE
pE
, is strictly dominated by (qE, pE).
The proof of Lemma 2 can be found in the Appendix. In order to make
sure that the low type does not buy the decoy, his participation constraint
must be taken into account. The exclusion product does not satisfy the
participation constraint of the low type: qE
pE
< θ. Any lower quality prod-
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uct which makes quality salient does not satisfy the participation constraint
either, since qD
pD
< qE
pE
⇒ qD
pD
< θ.
All products in the shaded area in Figure 2 satisfy the conditions for a
decoy, i.e. qD
pD
< qE
pE
, qD < qE and pD < pE. Such an area always exists.
Consider e.g. a product (x, pE − ε) with 0 < x < qE. There always exists
a sufficiently small ε > 0 such that ε < pE
qE
(qE − x), which implies quality
salience.
(0, 0) qD
pD
qE
pE
PCL
PCH
Figure 2: Possible decoys given exclusion product (qE , pE). For any product E
which makes the participation constraint of the high type binding, there exists an area
(gray) with products that have a lower price, a lower quality and a lower quality-price ratio
than product E. The lower quality and the lower quality-price ratio imply that neither of
the consumer types would prefer a product in that area.
If the exclusion product (qE, pE) satisfies the participation constraint of
the high type, the monopolist always finds a low-quality decoy that makes
quality salient. He can thus choose the exclusion product in order to max-
imize his profits, only considering the participation constraint of the high
type given quality is salient. The participation constraint of the high type
will be binding pE =
1
δ
qE. The monopolist maximizes his profit:
max
qE
1
δ
qE −
1
2
q2E. (21)
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The optimal quality is defined by the first order condition and the optimal
price is determined by the binding participation constraint of the high type:
qE =
1
δ
, pE =
1
δ2
. (22)
The monopolist will offer the efficient quality for high types who focus on
quality. The monopolist’s profit from exclusion is
πE =
1
δ2
1
2
α. (23)
If salience becomes more important, consumers give a higher relative
weight to quality in case of quality salience. The monopolist’s profit from
exclusion increases.
Proposition 3. The monopolist always excludes low types by use of a product
portfolio that makes quality salient.
If consumers have salience-driven preferences, the monopolist can increase
the consumers’ willingness to pay by excluding low types and making quality
salient. Exclusion thus entails the advantage of making quality salient. The
decoy which is offered together with the exclusion product needs to have the
following characteristics:
0 ≤ qD <
1
δ
,
1
δ
qD < pD <
1
δ2
. (24)
As it is typical for decoys, it is a “bad deal”, i.e. it has a lower quality-price
ratio than the product which is meant to be sold.
5.4 Pooling
If the monopolist pools the two types, he would again want to offer an addi-
tional product (qD, pD) as a decoy to make quality salient. Since the pooling
product satisfies the participation constraint of both consumer types, Lemma
1 and Lemma 2 can be applied for both consumer types. Given the pool-
ing product (qP , pP ), Lemma 1 implies that all high-quality products that
make quality salient would be preferred by both types and hence cannot be
used as a decoy. Lemma 2, in contrast, says that any lower quality product
24
with qD < qP and pD < pP which makes quality salient is not preferred by
consumers. Thus it is sufficient to show that there always exists a lower qual-
ity product which makes quality salient. Given (qP , pP ), all products in the
shaded area in Figure 3 are of lower quality and have a lower quality-price
ratio. They can thus be used as decoys.
(0, 0) qD
pD
qP
pP
ICL
ICH
Figure 3: Possible decoys given pooling product (qP , pP ). For any product P which
would pool the two types, there exists an area (gray) with products that have a lower
price, a lower quality and a lower quality-price ratio than product P . The lower quality
and the lower quality-price ratio imply that neither of the consumer types would prefer a
product in that area.
Again, such an area always exists. Consider e.g. a product (x, pP − ε)
with 0 < x < qP . There always exists an ε > 0 such that εqP < pP (qP − x),
which implies quality salience.
It is always possible to find a decoy that makes quality salient when
pooling. Therefore, the monopolist can choose the pooling product only
considering the participation constraints of both types given quality is salient.
The participation constraint of the low type is more restrictive and will thus
be binding pP =
1
δ
θqP . The monopolist maximizes his profit:
max
qP
1
δ
θqP −
1
2
q2P . (25)
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The first order condition and the binding participation constraint of the
low type determine the optimal product:
qP =
1
δ
θ, pP =
1
δ2
θ2. (26)
The monopolist will offer the efficient quality for low types who focus on
quality. Consumers’ willingness to pay is higher if they overvalue quality.
Quality and price are therefore higher than in the case of consumers with
standard preferences. The monopolist’s profits from pooling amount to
πP =
1
2
1
δ2
θ2. (27)
A stronger distortion of weights compared to the benchmark case imply
that consumers have a higher willingness to pay in case of quality salience.
The monopolist’s profit from pooling increases in the strength of salience.
Proposition 4. The monopolist always pools by use of a product portfolio
that makes quality salient.
Salient thinking of consumers enables the monopolist to increase their
willingness to pay. In the same way as exclusion, pooling thus comes at the
benefit of making quality salient. Given the pooling product, the monopolist
offers a decoy with:
0 ≤ qD <
1
δ
θ,
1
δ
θqD < pD <
1
δ2
θ2. (28)
In the case of pooling and of exclusion, the monopolist benefits from
offering a second product with lower quality and lower price. Since the
exclusion product has higher quality and price than the pooling product, the
decoy can also have higher attribute values in this case. Decoys are used
to make quality salient and therefore only appear if they successfully do so.
There are no decoys when we observe price salience.
5.5 Optimal strategy
In the last subsections, I derived the monopolist’s strategies and the profits
he can achieve by applying them. The monopolist can choose to separate by
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use of a product portfolio which makes price salient. Alternatively, he can
exclude the low types or pool both types by use of product portfolios which
make quality salient. The monopolist’s profits given each strategy are:
Separation: πS =
1
2
1
1− α
δ2(θ2 + α− 2αθ) (29)
Exclusion: πE =
1
2
1
δ2
α (30)
Pooling: πP =
1
2
1
δ2
θ2. (31)
In order to find the optimal strategy given the valuation θ and the share
of high types α, the monopolist compares these profits. When the monopo-
list decides between separation with price salience and pooling with quality
salience, he prefers separation if and only if the relative valuation of low types
is low enough:
πS ≥ πP ⇔ θ ≤
δ2
√
α2δ4 + α(1− α− δ4)− αδ4
1− α− δ4
≡ θ̂1(α). (32)
The difference πS − πP is decreasing in θ. Hence, it is positive if and only if
θ is not too high. In the benchmark case, separation was always preferred
to pooling. However, in the presence of salient thinking, separation requires
consumers to focus on price which reduces the profit. In contrast to that, the
profit from pooling increases since quality is salient which makes consumers
willing to pay more. Therefore, there is now a range of high valuations for
which pooling is the optimal strategy when consumers exhibit salience-driven
preferences.
Comparing the profits from pooling and exclusion, the monopolist prefers
to exclude if and only if the valuation of the low type is not too high:
πE ≥ πP ⇔ θ ≤ α1/2 ≡ θ̂2(α). (33)
Salient thinking of consumers does not change the payoff-comparison between
pooling and excluding. Both strategies make quality salient which increases
profits by the same factor.
Finally, the difference πS−πE increases in θ whenever α ≤ θ, i.e. whenever
separation is possible. Hence, there is a third threshold for the valuation of
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the low type θ̂3(α):
πS ≥ πE ⇔ θ ≥ α + α1/2(1− α)1/2
(
1
δ4
− 1
)1/2
≡ θ̂3(α). (34)
For valuations above this threshold, separation is preferred to exclusion.
Given salient thinking of consumers, the profits from exclusion increase if δ
decreases, while the profits from separation decrease. It is thus less likely than
in the benchmark case that the monopolist prefers separation, i.e. θ̂3(α) ≥ α.
Proposition 5 uses the three thresholds and provides a formal description
of the monopolist’s optimal strategy:
Proposition 5. The optimal strategy of the monopolist given salience-driven
preferences can be characterized as follows:
1. Separation: If θ̂1 ≥ θ ≥ θ̂3, the monopolist separates with products L
and H: qH = δ and pH = δ
2 1
1−α [1+θ
2−(1+α)θ], qL = δθ− α1−αδ(1−θ)
and pL = δ
2θ2 − α
1−αδ
2θ(1− θ). Price is salient for both products.
2. Exclusion: If θ ≤ min[θ̂2, θ̂3], the monopolist only serves high types
with product E: qE =
1
δ
α and pE =
1
δ2
α. He additionally offers a
decoy D: 0 ≤ qD < 1δ and
1
δ
qD < pD <
1
δ2
. Quality is salient for both
products.
3. Pooling: If θ ≥ max[θ̂1, θ̂2], the monopolist serves both types of con-
sumers with product P : qP =
1
δ
θ and pP =
1
δ2
θ2. He additionally offers
a decoy D: 0 ≤ qD < 1δθ and
1
δ
θqD < pD <
1
δ2
θ2. Quality is salient for
both products.
Figures 4 and 5 show the optimal strategy for varying shares of high types
α and relative valuations θ. Consumers with standard preferences (δ = 1)
are separated if θ ≥ α. In all other cases, the monopolist excludes the low
types.
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Separation
Exclusion
α
θ
Figure 4: Optimal strategy of monopolist if consumers have standard prefer-
ences, i.e. δ = 1. A monopolist maximizes profits by separating consumers if hetero-
geneity and the share of high types are low, and excluding low types otherwise.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pooling
Separation
Exclusion
α
θ
Figure 5: Optimal strategy of monopolist if consumers have salience-driven
preferences, i.e. δ < 1. A monopolist maximizes profits by pooling consumers if
heterogeneity and the share of high types are low, and excluding low types if heterogeneity
and the share of high types are high. Separation is optimal for an intermediate range of
heterogeneity and share of high types.
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If salience becomes stronger, i.e. δ decreases, the costs of price salience in
the separation case become more severe, while the gains of quality salience
with pooling and excluding increase. It follows that the monopolist will
choose separation less often if consumers have salience-driven preferences.
If salience is strong enough [δ < δ̂(α) ≡ 0.841(1 + α 12 ) 14 ], separation
is always dominated by exclusion or pooling. This follows from the fact
that given δ < δ̂(α), exclusion and pooling are preferred to separation at
θ̂2, i.e. where exclusion and pooling are equally beneficial. For θ < θ̂2,
exclusion is preferred to separation because profits from separation decrease
if θ decreases, while profits from exclusion remain constant. For θ > θ̂2,
profits from pooling are higher that profits from separation since profits from
pooling increase faster in θ. Hence, a range in which separation is optimal
exists if and only if δ ≥ δ̂(α). While the monopolist never sells the same
product to both types of consumers with standard preferences (i.e. he never
pools), pooling is optimal given salience-driven consumer preferences if the
valuation of the low type is high.
As shown earlier, both types of consumers focus on the same attribute. It
is thus of interest how the characteristics of a market determine the attribute
on which consumers focus.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
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α
θ
Figure 6: Salience in a monopolistic market. Price is salient in a market with inter-
mediate heterogeneity and an intermediate share of high types.
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Which attribute is salient relates directly to the strategy of the monopo-
list. Figure 6 shows which attribute is salient depending on the share of high
types and the valuation of low types. Due to the direct relation between
strategy and salience, Proposition 5 gives us some insights on when price
salience can be observed:
Corollary 1. Suppose that δ ∈ (δ̂(α), 1]. Whether we observe a quality- or a
price-salient market depends on the distribution of types and their degree of
heterogeneity. Quality is salient in markets with low heterogeneity and low
share of high types and in markets with high heterogeneity and high share of
high types. Price is salient in markets with intermediate heterogeneity and
intermediate share of high types.
If salience becomes stronger, the monopolist is more likely to induce qual-
ity salience. In a quality salient market, the consumers overestimate the
value which the products will give to them. The monopolist benefits from
this misperception and achieves higher profits. In a price salient market, the
consumers underestimate the value of the products. The lower willingness
to pay reduces the return on quality for the monopolist and induces him to
provide lower quality.
The theory presented predicts that the monopolist will always offer two
products. Whenever consumers focus on quality, the low-quality product is a
decoy and not actually sold. The high-quality product is then a “better deal”
in the sense that it is offered with a quality discount relative to the low-quality
product. When consumers focus on price, the monopolist is separating the
types and the high-quality product is a “bad deal”, i.e. it is offered with
a quality premium. The range for which separation with price salience and
a quality premium is optimal becomes small if salience gains importance.
As Maskin and Riley (1984), we can interpret quality as quantity. Salience-
driven consumer preferences then provide an explanation for why quantity
premia are rare in reality. Gerstner and Hess (1987) studied the pricing of
a supermarket and found that only 1.7% of the packages were offered with
a quantity premium. Kokovin et al. (2008) observe that some expensive
liquor and expensive chocolate is offered with quantity premia. Verboven
(1999) claims that many products, e.g. cars and hotel rooms, are offered
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with extra options that seem to be overpriced. For these products, we would
predict separation with price salience if the monopolist is restricted to only
two variants.
The model also provides an explanation for the observation that, when
several products are offered, the price often varies with quality less than
expected (Orbach and Einav, 2007; Courty and Nasiry, 2016; Richardson
and Stähler, 2016; DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2017). A monopolist who
faces consumers with salience-driven preferences has to take into account
that a high price difference attracts consumers’ attention towards the price.
Whenever he pools or excludes the low types, he thus offers two products
with a small price difference in order to make consumers focus on quality.
6 Robustness
So far, the analysis restricted attention to a monopolist who could not offer
more than two products. Avoiding price salience in case of separation requires
the development and introduction of at least one additional product. The
optimal strategy of a monopolist thus depends on how costly it is to develop
additional decoys. Without development costs, it turns out that it is always
possible to make quality salient by offering enough decoys. Assuming that
there are non-zero development costs, the result holds that the monopolist
will be less likely to separate than when consumers had standard preferences.
In this section, I first assume that there are no development costs and
allow for a third product. It turns out that there are situations in which
the monopolist cannot find a third product that would make the optimally
separating products quality salient. However, he can always offer a decoy that
makes the high-quality product quality salient and the low-quality product
price salient. Whenever separation is optimal, the monopolist benefits from
using such a decoy. This suggests that whenever there is separation, there
will be at least one decoy offered.
In a second step, I keep the assumption of no development cost but let
the monopolist offer as many decoys as he wishes. I can show that it is then
always possible to separate optimally with quality salience.
If there were some development costs per decoy, the monopolist would
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face a trade-off between the gain from more beneficial salience and the devel-
opment costs. Thus, in a situation in which separation would be optimal, the
predictions of the salience of attributes and of the number of decoys depends
on development costs. If development costs are high, we expect to observe no
decoys and price salience (and less separation than in the benchmark case).
If development costs are low, the monopolist would offer decoys and a qual-
ity salient product portfolio. As in the case of two products, we would only
observe decoys if quality is salient for at least one of the products that are
sold. If price is salient for both products, the decoys were useless and should
thus not be offered.
Finally, I show the robustness of the results of Section 5 for a general
utility function and a general cost function.
6.1 Three products
The restriction that the monopolist can offer at most two products makes it
impossible to separate the types and make quality salient at the same time.
However, the monopolist might consider offering a third product as a decoy.
With a decoy, the monopolist can influence the salience of the attributes
while separating with two other products. Quality becomes salient if the
decoy increases the variation in quality sufficiently.
I assume that it is impossible to offer a product with negative quality. It
can then be shown that when offering the optimal separating products given
quality salience (qqH , p
q
H) and (q
q
L, p
q
L), it is not always possible to find a decoy
which induces such salience. Thus, the monopolist cannot always reach the
optimal quality salience profit under separation. This suggests that there will
be less separation in the case of salience-driven preferences compared to the
benchmark even when a third product could be offered without development
costs.
Proposition 6. Given the optimal products for separation with quality salience,
it is impossible for the monopolist to make quality salient with a single decoy
with non-negative quality if α > 2θ − 1 and θ < δ2.
The lower bound on the share of high types is derived from the condition
that the decoy must have non-negative quality. If the share of high types is
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high, the quality of product L is rather low and the decoy needs to have a very
low quality in order to bring more variation in the quality dimension. The
threshold is increasing in the valuation of the low type. A higher valuation
increases the quality of the low type’s product and makes it more likely
to find a decoy with non-negative quality that increases quality variation
sufficiently. Together with the condition θ < δ2, the lower bound on α is
sufficient to imply that all high-quality decoys would be preferred by the
high type.
In order to derive the conditions on the share of high types and the low
type’s valuation, we first have to determine the optimal products given qual-
ity salience. The derivation is analogous to the case in which both products
are price salient. The incentive compatibility constraints imply that qH ≥ qL.
The incentive compatibility constraint of the high type and the participation
constraint of the low type are binding. This makes the incentive compati-
bility constraint of the low type and the participation constraint of the high
type redundant. Hence, the optimal products given quality salience are:
qqH =
1
δ
, (35)
qqL =
1
δ
θ − 1
δ
α
1− α
(1− θ), (36)
pqH =
1
δ2
1
1− α
[1 + θ2 − (1 + α)θ], (37)
pqL =
1
δ2
θ2 − 1
δ2
α
1− α
θ(1− θ). (38)
I now derive the conditions on the share of high types and the low types
valuation. Given the three products H, L and D, the average quality is
q̄ = qH+qL+qD
3
and the average price is p̄ = pH+pL+pD
3
. We can consider the
quality-price space for the decoy D to determine its consequences on the
salience of the attributes of products L and H. Proposition 1 of Bordalo et
al. (2013b) can be applied if (q − q̄)(p − p̄) > 0. It then tells us that for
product k = H,L, quality is salient if and only if
qk ≷ q̄ , pk ≷ p̄ with
qk
pk
≷
q̄
p̄
. (39)
For product k, this implies that quality is salient if and only if the decoy is
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such that
pD ≷ qD
pk
qk
+ q−k
(
pk
qk
− p−k
q−k
)
≡ p̄k with qk ≷ q̄ and pk ≷ p̄. (40)
The symmetry of the salience function further allows us to determine the
salience of attributes for products with (q − q̄)(p − p̄) < 0. By definition,
quality is salient if and only if
σ(q, q̄) > σ(p, p̄) =︸︷︷︸
symmetry
σ(p̄, p).
Homogeneity of degree 0 of the salience function then gives us a condition
for quality salience which is similar to the condition in the previous case:
σ
(
q
q̄
, 1
)
> σ
(
p̄
p
, 1
)
⇔ q
q̄
≷
p̄
p
when q ≷ q̄ and p ≶ p̄. (41)
In our case of three products, this implies that quality is salient for prod-
uct k if the price of the decoy satisfies
pD ≶
9qkpk
qk + q−k + qD
− pk − p−k ≡ p̄k with qk ≷ q̄ and pk ≶ p̄. (42)
Conditions (40) and (42) as well as the conditions for qk ≷ q̄ and pk ≷ p̄
allow us to partition the quality-price space. In Figure 7, I do so for the case
in which
qH
pH
<
qL
pL
with qH > qL and pH > pL, (43)
since this is always true for the optimal separating products given the same
attribute is salient for product L and H. If the decoy (qD, pD) lies in the
gray area, the high-quality product H’s quality is salient. In the dotted area,
product L’s quality is salient.
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qD
pD
2pH − pL
2pL − pH
2qL − qH 2qH − qL
y
p̄H
p̄L
p̄H
p̄L
Figure 7: Possible decoys to make both products’ quality salient. Quality is salient
for product L if and only if product D lies in the dotted area. Quality is salient for product
H if and only if product D lies in the gray area.
In order to make quality salient for both products L and H, we need a
decoy where the two areas overlap. Additionally, if it should serve as a decoy,
it must not be preferred by neither of the types of consumers. We can derive
sufficient conditions under which such a decoy does not exist.
Lemma 3. Given separating products (qH , pH) and (qL, pL), quality is never
salient for both products if 2qL − qH < qD < 2qH − qL.
The proof can be found in the Appendix. Lemma 3 implies that a low-
quality product can only serve as a decoy if it has quality qD ≤ 2qL − qH .
Given the optimal products for quality salience, this implies that there exists
no low-quality decoy with non-negative quality if the share of high types is
high:
0 > 2qqL − q
q
H ⇔ α > 2θ − 1 ≡ ᾱ1(θ). (44)
This condition is always fulfilled if θ < 1
2
. Note that θ < 1 implies that there
is always a range of α for which separation is possible but no decoy exists:
α ∈ [2θ − 1, θ].
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The high-quality decoys all have non-negative quality since they must
have qD > 2qH − qL > 0. However, since we cannot increase the price too
much without drawing attention towards the price, consumers might prefer
to buy the high-quality decoy. I define product y as the product with quality
qy = 2q
q
H − q
q
L and the price py = p̄L(qy). Consider situations in which the
high type prefers product y to the optimal quality salient product H even if
product y was price salient (this implies he would also prefer the decoy if its
quality was salient):
qqH − δp
q
H < δqy − py. (45)
This condition is true if and only if the share of high types is high enough:
α >
(1− θ)θδ + (2θ − δ2)(2− θ)− 1
(1− δ)(δ + θ)
≡ ᾱ2(θ, δ), (46)
and the valuation of the low type is not too high:
θ <
1 + δ + δ2
2 + δ
. (47)
From (40), we know that if qD > qy, a necessary condition for product
L to be quality salient is pD < p̄L(qD). Furthermore, given price salience,
product y lies on the indifference curve pD = δqD−Uy with Uy = δqy− py. If
θ < δ2, the indifference curve is steeper in qD than p̄L, so if type H prefers a
price salient product y over a quality salient product H, he would also prefer
any other high-quality decoy that makes quality salient, even if its price was
salient. θ < δ2 implies that (47) is satisfied and thus (46) and θ < δ2 are
sufficient conditions for the non-existence of a high-quality decoy.
The threshold ᾱ1(θ) together with the condition θ < δ
2 implies that
ᾱ1(θ) > ᾱ2(θ, δ). Hence, we found sufficient conditions and no decoy exists
if α > ᾱ1(θ) and θ < δ
2.
Since exclusion and pooling always allow for quality salience, the trade-
off between strategies is the same as in the benchmark case whenever a
decoy can be found. However, in situations in which no decoy can be found,
the monopolist cannot separate and make quality salient for both optimally
separating products. The monopolist has to choose an alternative strategy if
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he wants to separate, as for example adapt products such that a decoy exists
or choosing a decoy that makes type H focus on quality and type L focus on
price etc.6 These strategies give lower profits than separation with optimally
separating products given quality salience. Hence, separation is again costly
and will possibly not be chosen as often as in the benchmark case even if we
abstract from development costs for a third product.
It is always possible for the monopolist to find a decoy which makes
the high-quality product quality salient and the low-quality product price
salient given the monopolist’s optimal products for such salience. Whenever
separation with price salience is the optimal strategy given the restriction of
two products, the strategy to make product H quality salient is possible and
yields higher profits.
Proposition 7. The monopolist always benefits from offering a decoy prod-
uct.
The proof is in the Appendix. If the high-quality product becomes quality
salient, the monopolist can increase pH and benefit from the higher willing-
ness to pay of the high type. The monopolist will thus always offer a decoy
when separating consumer types. If it is optimal to make product H quality
salient and product L price salient, this decoy has an intermediate quality
and price but a low quality-price ratio. As shown before, the monopolist also
benefits from decoys when he optimally excludes or pools.
6.2 Multiple decoys
While the monopolist is not always able to induce quality salience with a
single decoy, it might be possible with multiple decoys. It turns out that
the monopolist can always make separating products quality salient if he can
offer enough decoys.
Proposition 8. The monopolist can separate while making quality salient
for the separating products. In addition to the optimally separating products
6The determination of the optimal strategy of the monopolist in this case is left to
future work.
38
(qqH , p
q
H) and (q
q
L, p
q
L), he can offer d̂ decoys with
qD = 0 and pD =
1
d̂
[
(d̂+ 2)2qqLp
q
L
qqH + q
q
L
− pqL − p
q
H
]
,
where d̂ is the smallest integer greater than or equal to
d ≡ (qqH + q
q
L)
(
pqH
pqLq
q
Hq
q
L
) 1
2
− 2.
This is a sufficient condition.
To get these insights, I define an M -decoy, which is determined by all
decoys offered. The attribute values of the M -decoy are defined as the sum
of the attribute values of the single decoys i, i = 1, ..., d: qM =
∑d
i=1 qi and
pM =
∑d
i=1 pi. We can draw the graph with the sum of the decoy-qualities on
the horizontal and the sum of the decoy-prices on the vertical. In the same
way as for one decoy, we can then determine the areas in which the M -decoy
must lie to make quality salient for the products (qqH , p
q
H) and (q
q
L, p
q
L). If
qM
pM
(d + 1)pH − pL
(d + 1)pL − pH
(d + 1)qL − qH (d + 1)qH − qL
x
z
p̄H
p̄L
p̄MH
p̄ML
Figure 8: Possible M-decoys that make both products quality salient. Quality is
salient for product L if and only if product M lies in the dotted area. Quality is salient
for product H if and only if product M lies in the gray area.
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(qk − q̄)(pk − p̄) > 0, for product k = H,L, quality is salient if and only if
the M -decoy is such that
pM ≷ p̄k(qM) with qk ≷ q̄ and pk ≷ p̄. (48)
If (qk − q̄)(pk − p̄) < 0, quality is salient for product k if and only if the
price of the M -decoy satisfies
pM ≶
(d+ 2)2qqkp
q
k
qq−k + q
q
k + qM
− pqk − p
q
−k ≡ p̄
M
k (qM) with qk ≷ q̄ and pk ≶ p̄. (49)
In order to make quality salient for both products H and L, the M -
decoy has to lie in the gray and dotted area in Figure 8, i.e. either qM <
(d + 1)qL − qH and p̄H(qM) < pM < p̄ML (qM) or qM > (d + 1)qH − qL and
p̄MH (qM) < pM < p̄L(qM).
Product x is the low-quality M -decoy with the highest quality:
px = arg max q̃ with q̃ = min
{
p̄−1H (q), p̄
M−1
L (q)
}
. (50)
While the inverse of p̄H(q) is increasing in px, the inverse of p̄
M
L (q) is
decreasing in px. Hence, the minimum is maximized if the two arguments
are equalized and we get the following expressions for product x:
px = (d+ 2)
(
qqL
qqH
pqHp
q
L
) 1
2
− pqH − p
q
L, (51)
qx = (d+ 2)
(
pqL
pqH
qqHq
q
L
) 1
2
− qqH − q
q
L. (52)
These values are always such that
qx ≤ (d+ 1)qqL − q
q
H (53)
and
(d+ 1)pqL − p
q
H ≤ px ≤ (d+ 1)p
q
H − p
q
L (54)
and thus, quality is indeed salient for both products.
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Adding more decoys increases the quality of product x. Thus, more decoys
make it more likely that it has non-negative quality. The number of decoys
d must be higher than d to guarantee the decoys have non-negative quality:
qx ≥ 0⇔ d ≥ d = (qqH + q
q
L)
(
pqH
pqLq
q
Hq
q
L
) 1
2
− 2. (55)
The lowest integer that is higher than d is thus a sufficient number of decoys.
In order to make sure that both types would not prefer the single decoys,
we can use zero quality for the M -decoy. Zero quality and a positive price for
the M -decoy makes sure that the single decoys would also have zero quality
and a positive price, which would give negative utility to consumers.
We know that (d+1)qqL−q
q
H > qx > 0 and this implies that p̄
M
L (0) > (d+
1)pqL−p
q
H . From conditions (48) and (49), we know that quality is then salient
for both products L and H either if (d+1)pqH−p
q
L > p̄
M
L (0) and p̄H(0) < pM <
p̄ML (0) or if (d + 1)p
q
H − p
q
L < p̄
M
L (0) and pM < min[p̄
M
L (0), p̄
M
H (0)] = p̄
M
L (0).
Hence, the highest price we can ask for that still makes quality salient for
both products given qM = 0 is determined by p̄
M
L (0):
pM(qM = 0) =
(d+ 2)2qqLp
q
L
qqH + q
q
L
− pqL − p
q
H . (56)
This price is increasing in d and thus always positive for d ≥ d since
pM(qM = 0)|d = (p
q
H
qqL
qqH
− pqL) =
qqL(q
q
H − q
q
L)(1− θ)
qqH
> 0. (57)
Condition (55) is sufficient but might not be necessary, since there could
be a high-quality M -decoy. If we assume there is an upper bound on quality
q̂, the assumption implies that the single decoys cannot have quality higher
than q̂, i.e. qM ≤ d · q̂. From the high-quality M -decoys which make quality
salient for H and L, product z is most likely to satisfy this condition:
pz = arg min q̃
′ with q̃′ = max
{
p̄−1L (q), p̄
M−1
H (q)
}
. (58)
Since the two inverse functions move in opposite directions when changing
p, the maximum in minimized if they are just equal. Given the optimal
products, the lowest high-quality decoy has quality
qz = (d+ 2)
(
pqH
pqL
qqHq
q
L
) 1
2
− qqH − q
q
L. (59)
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These values are always such that
qz ≥ (d+ 1)qqH − q
q
L (60)
and
(d+ 1)pqL − p
q
H ≤ pz ≤ (d+ 1)p
q
H − p
q
L (61)
and thus, quality is indeed salient for both products.
If we use it as M -decoy, the quality of each decoy qD must be feasible to
produce:
qD =
qz
d
≤ q̂
⇔ q̂ ≥ d+ 2
d
(
pqH
pqL
qqHq
q
L
) 1
2
− 1
d
(qqH + q
q
L). (62)
The RHS is increasing in d:
∂ qz
d
∂d
= − 1
d2
[
2
√
qH
θ
(qH − (1− δ)qL)− qH − qL
]
< − 1
d2
(qH − qL) < 0. (63)
Hence, d > 1 will not fulfill the restriction whenever d = 1 does not, i.e.
whenever the upper bound on quality is low:
q̂ < 3
(
pqH
pqL
qqHq
q
L
) 1
2
− qqH − q
q
L. (64)
Therefore, condition (55) is necessary and sufficient to make quality salient
if the monopolist wants to separate with the optimal products L and H and
there is an upper bound on quality q̂ < qz(d = 1). Without the upper bound
on quality, (55) is sufficient but might not be necessary.
6.3 General utility function
Given the salience of an attribute is determined by the subjective utility
from quality rather than the objective quality, the result that a monopolist
is less prone to separate if he faces consumers with salience-driven preferences
does not depend on the linearity of preferences. Consider consumers with
experience utility that is nonlinear in the taste parameter θi, i.e. u(q, θi)− p,
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with u(q, θi) increasing and concave in q and satisfying the single crossing
property, i.e. the marginal utility of quality increases in θi. With such
experience utility, different types might focus on different attributes. Given
two products (qL, pL) and (qH , pH), with qH > qL and pH > pL, a consumer
i focuses on quality if and only if
u(qH , θi)
pH
>
u(qL, θi)
pL
. (65)
I show in the following that the monopolist again always separates with
products that make both consumer types focus on price, while he excludes
and pools with a decoy that implies quality salience.
Similar to Lemma 1, the monopolist cannot separate the types without
making the low type focus on price. Consider a consumer with utility function
γu(q, θi) − ωp, with γ ∈ (0, 1] and ω ∈ (0, 1],7 and two products L and
H with qH ≥ qL and pH ≥ pL. It is impossible to make type L focus
on quality while satisfying his participation and his incentive compatibility
constraint. Assume (qL, pL) satisfies the participation constraint of type L,
i.e. γu(qL, θL) − ωpL ≥ 0. If the monopolist wants to separate, the high-
quality product has to satisfy
pH ≥
γ
ω
[u(qH , θL)− u(qL, θL)] + pL. (66)
In order to make quality salient, the high-quality product has to satisfy
pH <
u(qH , θL)
u(qL, θL)
pL. (67)
To find such a product is possible if and only if
u(qH , θL)
u(qL, θL)
pL >
γ
ω
[u(qH , θL)− u(qL, θL)] + pL ⇔
pL
u(qL, θL)
>
γ
ω
, (68)
which violates the participation constraint PCL. Hence, it is impossible
to separate consumers and induce type L to focus on quality. Separating
with no attribute being salient for the low type is possible but would imply
7Note that γ = 1 and ω = δ captures quality salience while γ = δ and ω = 1 captures
price salience and γ = 1 and ω = 1 is equivalent to neutral salience. Hence, the following
analysis shows that separation results in type L focusing on price in all three cases.
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that the monopolist optimally offers the same product to both consumers.
The neutral salience condition pH = pL
u(qH ,θL)
u(qL,θL)
and the ICL given neutral
salience together imply that pL ≥ u(qL, θL). Considering the PCL given
neutral salience, it follows that pL = u(qL, θL) and thus pH = u(qH , θL). It
is then profit-maximizing for the monopolist to offer the same product to
both types. However, this strategy is always dominated by pooling with a
decoy that makes quality salient (we see later in this section that pooling
with quality salience is always possible).
While type L thus necessarily focuses on price whenever separation is
optimal, the monopolist could design the products such that quality is salient
for type H. However, quality salience requires the price of the high-quality
product to be rather low. It turns out that this restriction on the price pH
is so strong, that the monopolist prefers to increase the price and let type H
focus on price too. To see this, note that type H focuses on quality if and
only if the price pH is not too high:
pH <
u(qH , θH)
u(qL, θH)
pL. (69)
Inducing quality salience for the high type is beneficial if and only if the
quality salience condition (69) is less restrictive than the ICH given price
salience, i.e. if and only if
δ[u(qH , θH)− u(qL, θH)] + pL <
u(qH , θH)
u(qL, θH)
pL ⇔ δ <
pL
u(qL, θH)
. (70)
This is never true since condition (70) violates the participation constraint of
type L. Similarly, inducing neutral salience for type H is not optimal, since
it requires
pH =
u(qH , θH)
u(qL, θH)
pL. (71)
Replacing the strict inequalities in (70) with weak inequalities shows that
this condition is again more restrictive than the ICH given price salience.
Hence, the result that the monopolist separates with price salient products
and thus separation is less beneficial than in the benchmark case holds for
more general utility functions.
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When the monopolist wants to exclude low types or pools, it is again
possible to offer a decoy that makes quality salient for both types. I prove
the existence of such decoys in the Appendix. Since separation comes at
a cost while pooling and exclusion benefit from quality salience, it follows
that the monopolist is less likely to separate consumers with salience-driven
preferences.
Considering the trade-off between pooling and exclusion, nothing changes
when consumers have salience-driven preferences. When the monopolist
pools, he chooses the quality in order to maximize u(qP , θL) − 12q
2
P . When
he wants to exclude the low types, he offers the quality that maximizes
α[u(qE, θH) − 12q
2
E]. Since θL → θH implies that qP → qE, pooling is pre-
ferred to exclusion if the valuations do not differ too much and the share of
high types α is low.
If the salience of quality is determined by the objective quality, the results
from Section 5 rely on the linearity of the indifference curves in quality.
Each indifference curve then only cuts the constant ratio line once, which
is important for Lemma 1. With decreasing marginal utility of quality, a
higher quality product with higher quality-price ratio would not necessarily
be preferred by the consumers.
6.4 General cost function
It is possible to show that the results from Section 5 hold for all cost functions
with c′(q) > 0 and c′′(q) > 0. The proofs of the Lemmas are independent of
the monopolist’s cost. The monopolist’s possible strategies are thus still to
separate with price salience, exclude or pool with quality salient products.
Price salience decreases the willingness to pay of a consumer compared to
the benchmark case. Therefore, separation will be less profitable in case of
salience-driven consumer preferences. To show this, consider the profit of
separation with price salience, where q∗H and q
∗
L are the profit-maximizing
qualities given δ:
πS(δ) = α[δ(q
∗
H − q∗L) + δθq∗L − c(q∗H)] + (1− α)[δθq∗L − c(q∗L)]. (72)
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If salience becomes weaker, i.e. δ increases by ∆δ, the monopolist can in-
crease the price pH by ∆δ[(q
∗
H − q∗L) + θq∗L] and price pL by ∆δθq∗L, which
strictly increases his profits and leaves the salience of attributes unchanged.
Additionally, the monopolist could adapt the qualities of the products he
offers, but he would do so only if it was profitable. The profit of separation
thus strictly increases if salience becomes weaker.
In contrast, quality salience increases the willingness to pay and exclusion
and pooling become more profitable. The maximal profit of exclusion given
salience parameter δ amounts to
πE(δ) = α[
1
δ
q∗E − c(q∗E)]. (73)
If salience becomes stronger, i.e. δ decreases by ∆δ, the monopolist can
increase price pE by
[
1
δ−∆δ −
1
δ
]
q∗E and the high type would still be willing
to buy it given its quality is still salient. In Section 5.3, we showed that the
monopolist can indeed always find a decoy that makes product E quality
salient whenever product E satisfies the participation constraint. Therefore,
stronger salience strictly increases the monopolist’s profit. Adapting qE could
additionally increase the profit.
The maximal profit of pooling given salience parameter δ amounts to
πP (δ) =
1
δ
θq∗P − c(q∗P ). (74)
If salience becomes stronger, i.e. δ decreases by ∆δ, the monopolist can
increase price pP by
[
1
δ−∆δ −
1
δ
]
θq∗P and both types still buy product P given
quality is still salient. From Section 5.4, we know there is a decoy that
makes quality salient given a pooling product that satisfies the participation
constraints. Hence, stronger salience strictly increases profits and adapting
qP could even increase these gains.
Profits from exclusion and pooling thus strictly increase in the strength
of salience, while the profit from separation decreases. There is again a cost
of separation and a benefit to exclusion and to pooling. In case of salience-
driven preferences and two products on offer, the parameter range for which
the monopolist chooses to separate the consumer types is smaller.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the effect of salient thinking of consumers on the
prevalence of (monopolistic) price discrimination. In my model, a monopolist
faces consumers with salience-driven preferences who are heterogeneous in
their valuation of quality. When designing his products, the monopolist has
to take into account the products’ influence on the salience of their attributes.
Consumers give a higher weight to the attribute which varies more within
the choice set. In the case of two types of consumers, it turns out that a
monopolist is less likely to price discriminate when consumers have salience-
driven preferences.
The optimally separating products always induce price salience, which re-
duces the willingness to pay of the consumers. If the monopolist is restricted
to offer two products, he can thus not avoid price salience when separating.
When excluding low types or pooling, the monopolist can offer a decoy that
lets consumers focus on quality.
Allowing the monopolist to offer more products, he might be able to
induce quality salience also when separating by additionally offering decoy
products. It turns out that this is always possible if the monopolist can
offer sufficiently many decoys. Whenever it is costly to develop such decoys,
the monopolist is less likely to separate than in the case of consumers with
standard preferences.
Future research should concentrate on characterizing the complete opti-
mal strategy of the monopolist given more than two versions of a product are
possible. Furthermore, one could introduce an exogenous offer by another
firm. If this offer yields negative utility to the consumers, the monopolist can
increase his prices. At a higher level of prices, it is less likely that the same
price difference induces price salience and the monopolist might be able to
separate with products that induce quality salience.
It would also be interesting to test empirically whether indeed consumers
focus on price if the monopolist separates. Furthermore, one could test
whether a monopolist always offers products with the intention to influence
attention. This should be more likely to be observed if development costs of
decoys are low.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider two products L and H with qH ≥ qL and pH ≥ pL. Assume (qL, pL)
satisfies the participation constraint γqL − ωpL ≥ 0, with γ ∈ (0, 1] and
ω ∈ (0, 1]:
γqL − ωpL ≥ 0 (75)
⇒ pL
qL
≤ γ
ω
(76)
⇒ pL
qL
(qH − qL) ≤
γ
ω
(qH − qL) (77)
⇔ γ
ω
qL − pL ≤
γ
ω
qH − qH
pL
qL
. (78)
Quality salience (pH < qH
pL
qL
) implies:
⇒ γ
ω
qL − pL <
γ
ω
qH − pH (79)
⇔ γqL − ωpL < γqH − ωpH . (80)
The product (qH , pH) is strictly preferred by the consumer.
This lemma shows that both types would prefer product H, independent
of which attribute is salient. Considering the low type, γ = θ and ω = δ
captures the case of quality salience, γ = θ and ω = 1 captures the case of
neutral salience and γ = δθ and ω = 1 captures the case of price salience.
Considering the high type, γ = 1 and ω = δ captures the case of quality
salience, γ = 1 and ω = 1 captures the case of neutral salience and γ = δ
and ω = 1 captures the case of price salience.
8.2 Separation with neutral salience
If quality salience and separation is not possible, the monopolist can try to
separate while keeping salience neutral. Salience is neutral, i.e. consumers
give equal weights to quality and price, if the two quality-price ratios are
equal. The monopolist then takes into account the participation constraints
and the incentive compatibility constraints of the benchmark case.
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The ICL and the neutral salience condition pH =
qH
qL
pL imply that pL ≥
θqL. Together with the participation constraint of the low type, this means
that pL = θqL and hence pH = θqH .
The monopolist therefore maximizes profits:
max
qH ,qL
α(θqH −
1
2
q2H) + (1− α)(θqL −
1
2
q2L). (81)
It follows that the optimal product is the same for both types, i.e. the
monopolist would pool the types. Even though there exist two products with
which the monopolist can separate the types and make no attribute salient,
such separation is dominated by pooling with neutral consumers. I show in
Subsection 5.4 that the monopolist can always pool with quality salience.
Pooling with neutral consumers is thus always dominated.
8.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider two products E and D with qE ≥ qD and pE ≥ pD. Assume (qE, pE)
satisfies the participation constraint γqE − ωpE ≥ 0:
⇒ pE
qE
≤ γ
ω
(82)
⇒ pE
qE
(qE − qD) ≤
γ
ω
(qE − qD) (83)
⇔ γ
ω
qD − qD
pE
qE
≤ γ
ω
qE − pE. (84)
Quality salience (pD > qD
pE
qE
) implies:
⇒ γ
ω
qD − pD <
γ
ω
qE − pE (85)
⇔ γqD − ωpD < γqE − ωpE. (86)
This lemma shows that both types would strictly prefer product E, inde-
pendent of which attribute is salient. Considering the low type, γ = θ and
ω = δ captures the case of quality salience, γ = θ and ω = 1 captures the
case of neutral salience and γ = δθ and ω = 1 captures the case of price
salience. Considering the high type, γ = 1 and ω = δ captures the case of
quality salience, γ = 1 and ω = 1 captures the case of neutral salience and
γ = δ and ω = 1 captures the case of price salience.
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8.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Given separating products (qH , pH) and (qL, pL), quality is never salient for
both products if 2qL − qH < qD < 2qH − qL.
Consider qD ∈ [2qL − qH , 2qH − qL].
• Case 1 : pD < 2pL − pH
Product H cannot be quality salient since quality salience would require
pD > p̄H . This is impossible with pD < 2pL − pH because then p̄H >
2pL − pH whenever qD > 3 qHpH pL − qH − qL which is true for our range
of qD and any separating products, i.e. if
qH
pH
< qL
pL
.
• Case 2 : 2pL − pH < pD < 2pH − pL
Product H’s quality is salient if pD > p̄H and product L’s quality is
salient if pD < p̄L. It is impossible to satisfy both conditions since
p̄H > p̄L whenever
qH
pH
< qL
pL
, which is true for any separating products.
• Case 3 : pD > 2pH − pL
Product L cannot be quality salient since quality salience would require
pD < p̄L. This is impossible with pD > 2pH − pL since p̄L < 2pH − pL
whenever qD < 3
qL
pL
pH − qH − qL which is true for our range of qD and
any separating products, i.e. if qH
pH
< qL
pL
.
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8.5 Proof of Proposition 7
Optimal separating products if quality is salient for product H and
price is salient for product L
Maximization problem of the monopolist:
max
pH ,pL
α(pH −
1
2
q2H) + (1− α)(pL −
1
2
q2L)
s.t. δθqL − pL ≥ 0 PCL
qH − δpH ≥ 0 PCH
δθqL − pL ≥ θqH − δpH ICL
qH − δpH ≥ δqL − pL ICH
The PCL and the ICH imply that the PCH is redundant. The incentive
compatibility constraints imply that qH ≥ δqL. Increasing pH increases prof-
its, so the ICH will be binding. The ICL then becomes redundant. Increasing
pL increases profits until the PCL is binding.
max
qH ,qL
α[
1
δ
qH − qL(1− θ)−
1
2
q2H ] + (1− α)[δθqL −
1
2
q2L] (87)
s.t. qH ≥ δqL (88)
The monopolist can choose qL and qH optimally:
qqpL = δθ −
α
1− α
(1− θ) and qqpH =
1
δ
. (89)
These optimal qualities always satisfy the condition qH ≥ δqL, since we
always have qH ≥ 1 and qL ≤ 1.
Since I assume that qualities are non-negative, the maximization problem
has a corner solution, qqpL = 0, if the valuation of the low type is too low:
θ ≤ α
δ(1− α) + α
≡ θ̂4(α). (90)
However, the monopolist is then better off by excluding the low type.
Existence of decoy that makes quality salient for product H and
price salient for product L
First note that given such salience, the ICL implies that pH ≥ θ(1δ qH − qL) +
1
δ
pL. Together with the PCL it thus follows that
pH
qH
> 1
δ
θ. Furthermore, we
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know from PCL that
pL
qL
≤ δθ. Thus, it must be that any separating products
given such salience are such that
qH
pH
<
qL
pL
. (91)
Further, we found that the optimal products derived above are always
such that qH ≥ qL and pH ≥ pL since pH = 1δ qH − qL +
1
δ
pL ≥ pL. Given the
optimal products, we want to find a decoy which makes quality salient for
product H and price salient for product L. We thus need a decoy such that
the following holds:
q̄
p̄
<
qH
pH
<
qL
pL
, (92)
qL < q̄ < qH , (93)
pL < p̄ < pH . (94)
For the decoy, this implies it has to lie in the hatched area in Figure 9,
where
pD > qD
pH
qH
+ qL
(
pH
qH
− pL
qL
)
, (95)
2qH − qL > qD > 2qL − qH , (96)
2pH − pL > pD > 2pL − pH . (97)
Consider for example the product qD = qL and pD = 2pH − pL − e. It
easily satisfies conditions (96) and (97) when e→ 0. Furthermore, it satisfies
(95) for e→ 0:
2pH − pL − e > qL
pH
qH
+ qL
(
pH
qH
− pL
qL
)
⇔ e < 2pH
(
1− qL
qH
)
. (98)
Without determining which attribute is salient for the decoy, it is enough
to show that both types would not buy it even if it was quality is salient.
The high type does not prefer the decoy if and only if
qD − δpD < qH − δpH (99)
⇔ e < pH − pL +
1
δ
(qH − qL). (100)
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qD
pD
2pH − pL
2pL − pH
2qL − qH 2qH − qL
x
y
p̄H
p̄L
p̄H
p̄L
Figure 9: Possible decoys to make consumers focus on the quality of product H
and on the price of product L. Quality is salient for product L if and only if product
D lies in the dotted area. Quality is salient for product H if and only if product D lies in
the gray area. In the hatched area, quality is salient for product H and price is salient for
product L.
The low type does not prefer the decoy if
θqD − δpD < δθqL − pL (101)
⇔ e < 2pH − pL
(
1
δ
+ 1
)
− θqL
(
1
δ
− 1
)
. (102)
Plugging in the optimal products, the RHSs of (100) and (102) are strictly
positive and thus there exists an e→ 0 for which neither of the types prefers
the decoy. To see this for the RHS of (102), note that it is strictly increasing
in α:
∂RHS
∂α
=
(1− θ)(δ2θ + (2− 2θ)δ + θ)
δ(1− α)2
> 0, (103)
and already positive at α = 0:
RHS|α=0 =
2
δ2
− θ2δ2 + (2θ2 − 2θ)δ − θ2 > 0, (104)
since RHS|α=0 is strictly decreasing in θ:
∂ RHS|α=0
∂θ
= −2δ2θ − 2δ(1− θ)− 2θ(1− δ) < 0, (105)
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and still positive at θ = 1:
RHS|α=0,θ=1 =
2
δ2
− δ2 − 1 > 0. (106)
Hence, there always exists a decoy that makes quality salient for product H
and price salient for product L.
Comparison with profit from separation with price salient products
The monopolist prefers to separate with a decoy if
πqpS − πS ≥ 0. (107)
This difference is decreasing in δ and equal to zero at δ = 1:
∂[πqpS − πS]
∂δ
= −α[(1− 2θ + (2− α)θ
2)δ4 + θ(1− θ)(1− α)δ3 + (1− α)]
(1− α)δ3
.
(108)
(Note that the expression in the square brackets is decreasing in α and posi-
tive at α = 1). Hence, whenever both forms of separation exist, the monop-
olist prefers to induce the high-quality product to be quality salient.
Existence of separation
We can show that whenever separation with price salience would be preferred
to exclusion or pooling with a decoy, separation with quality-price salience
would also be possible since: θ̂2(α) ≥ θ̂4(α), for all α ∈ [0, 1] and all δ ∈ (0, 1].
To see this, note that the difference θ̂2(α)− θ̂4(α) strictly decreases in δ and
is equal to zero at δ = 1:
∂[θ̂2(α)− θ̂4(α)]
∂δ
= −2α
1/2(1− α)1/2
( 1
δ4
− 1)1/2δ5
+
α(1− α)
[δ(1− α) + α]2
< 0 (109)
⇔ T ≡ 4[δ + (1− δ)α]4 − α(1− α)δ6(1− δ4) > 0. (110)
T is positive since it is positive at δ = 0 [T (δ = 0) = 4α4] and strictly
increasing in δ:
∂T
∂δ
=16[δ3(1− α)3 + 2α2δ(1− α)(1− δ) + α2δ(1− α) (111)
+ α3(1− δ2) + 2αδ2(1− α)2] + 10αδ9 + αδ2(16− 6δ3) > 0.
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8.6 Proofs with a general utility function
The proof that price is salient for both types whenever the monopolist opti-
mally separates is presented in the main text. I show here that there always
exists a decoy that makes quality salient when the monopolist pools or ex-
cludes low types.
Exclusion. The optimal excluding product given quality salience (qE, pE)
satisfies the participation constraint of type H given quality is salient, i.e.
u(qE, θH) − δpE ≥ 0. Consider a product (qD, pD) with pD = pE − ε and
qD ∈ (0, qE) that satisfies the following conditions:
• It is strictly dominated for type L given quality salience:
ε <
1
δ
u(qE, θL)−
1
δ
u(qD, θL). (112)
• It is strictly dominated for type H given quality salience:
ε <
1
δ
u(qE, θH)−
1
δ
u(qD, θH). (113)
• It induces quality salience for type L:
ε < pE
[
1− u(qD, θL)
u(qE, θL)
]
. (114)
• It induces quality salience for type H:
ε < pE
[
1− u(qD, θH)
u(qE, θH)
]
. (115)
Since the RHSs for all four conditions are strictly positive, there always exists
an ε→ 0 such that they are all satisfied.
Pooling. The optimal pooling product given quality salience (qP , pP )
satisfies the participation constraint of type L given quality is salient, i.e.
u(qP , θL) − δpP ≥ 0. Consider a product (qD, pD) with pD = pP − ε and
qD ∈ (0, qP ) that satisfies the following conditions:
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• It is strictly dominated for type L given quality salience:
ε <
1
δ
u(qP , θL)−
1
δ
u(qD, θL). (116)
• It is strictly dominated for type H given quality salience:
ε <
1
δ
u(qP , θH)−
1
δ
u(qD, θH). (117)
• It induces quality salience for type L:
ε < pE
[
1− u(qD, θL)
u(qP , θL)
]
. (118)
• It induces quality salience for type H:
ε < pE
[
1− u(qD, θH)
u(qP , θH)
]
. (119)
Since the RHSs for all four conditions are strictly positive, there always exists
an ε→ 0 such that they are all satisfied.
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